Securing Your Company Messaging App with GCP Compute and Network Services

Complying with FIPS 140-2: Recommended Changes for Messaging App Architecture

Question

In an effort for your company messaging app to comply with FIPS 140-2, a decision was made to use GCP compute and network services.

The messaging app architecture includes a Managed Instance Group (MIG) that controls a cluster of Compute Engine instances.

The instances use Local SSDs for data caching and UDP for instance-to-instance communications.

The app development team is willing to make any changes necessary to comply with the standard Which options should you recommend to meet the requirements?

Answers

Explanations

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A. B. C. D.

D.

To comply with FIPS 140-2, the company messaging app needs to meet certain security requirements, including the use of encryption for data at rest and in transit. The app architecture includes a Managed Instance Group (MIG) that controls a cluster of Compute Engine instances. The instances use Local SSDs for data caching and UDP for instance-to-instance communications.

Option A: Encrypt all cache storage and VM-to-VM communication using the BoringCrypto module. This option suggests using the BoringCrypto module to encrypt both the cache storage and the instance-to-instance communication. BoringCrypto is a cryptographic library developed by Google that provides low-level cryptographic primitives. This option can help the messaging app comply with FIPS 140-2, as it provides encryption for both data at rest and in transit. However, it does not address the use of UDP for instance-to-instance communications, which may not be compliant with FIPS 140-2.

Option B: Set Disk Encryption on the Instance Template used by the MIG to customer-managed key and use BoringSSL for all data transit between instances. This option suggests using customer-managed key encryption for disk encryption on the instance template used by the MIG and using BoringSSL for all data transit between instances. BoringSSL is a TLS library developed by Google. This option can help the messaging app comply with FIPS 140-2, as it provides encryption for both data at rest and in transit. However, it does not address the use of UDP for instance-to-instance communications, which may not be compliant with FIPS 140-2.

Option C: Change the app instance-to-instance communications from UDP to TCP and enable BoringSSL on clients' TLS connections. This option suggests changing the instance-to-instance communications from UDP to TCP and enabling BoringSSL on clients' TLS connections. TCP is a more reliable and secure protocol than UDP, and BoringSSL provides encryption for TLS connections. This option can help the messaging app comply with FIPS 140-2, as it provides encryption for data in transit and improves the reliability and security of instance-to-instance communications. However, it does not address data at rest encryption.

Option D: Set Disk Encryption on the Instance Template used by the MIG to Google-managed Key and use BoringSSL library on all instance-to-instance communications. This option suggests using Google-managed key encryption for disk encryption on the instance template used by the MIG and using BoringSSL for all instance-to-instance communications. This option can help the messaging app comply with FIPS 140-2, as it provides encryption for data at rest and in transit. However, it does not address the use of UDP for instance-to-instance communications, which may not be compliant with FIPS 140-2.

Overall, Option C appears to be the best option as it addresses both data at rest and in transit encryption, and also improves the reliability and security of instance-to-instance communications. However, depending on the specific requirements of FIPS 140-2 compliance, other options may also be viable.